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Introduction 
The current model of pesticide risk assessment that determines the approval of 
pesticide substances in European Union is problematic, as it fails to prevent the use of 
harmful chemicals in the production of our food. These chemicals not only place 
farmers’ health at risk, but also that of residents, wildlife, ecosystems, and consumers, 
since pesticides contaminate the environment as well as our food.  However, the 
agribusiness industry has become such a profitable sector that evidence on the effects 
of pesticides on workers, consumers, the general population, animals, and the 
environment is often overlooked to protect the interests of the market and its economic 
operators, such as manufacturers, importers, exporters, traders, industries marketing 
pesticide products, and downstream industries. On a political level, the pesticide 
industry benefits from a situation where current short-term economic imperatives 
pressure EU farmers into keeping these products in use. If EU farmers decide to stop 
using certain pesticides, they may be ‘punished’ during their transition by the 
marketplace, as they will be competing with farmers in non-EU countries who continue 
using these chemicals. EU farmers should be able to improve their practices without 
being penalized for doing so.  
Pesticides are biologically active substances that are designed to poison living 
organisms (the target pests). Due to their toxic properties, pesticides are only approved 
for use after the producer has demonstrated that they are “safe” for humans and the 
environment, under realistic conditions of use. Assertions of the “safety” of pesticides at 
the European Union level are based largely on predictions and modelling tools. “Safety” 
is therefore not demonstrated, but presumed. For example, doses to which most people 
are exposed on a daily basis are not directly tested for safety. Instead, the safety of 
these typically low doses is extrapolated from higher doses stated not to cause specific 
adverse effects in industry-sponsored animal studies (e.g. with rodents). Doses 10 or 
100 times lower are then assumed to be safe for humans and other species, without 
actually being tested. This is of concern, since current scientific knowledge shows that 
exposure to chemicals, particularly during the early life stages, at low environmental 
doses may trigger alterations in the hormone, nervous or immune system, leading to 
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dysfunction and disease later in life – even though these effects are not evident at the 
higher doses that are tested for regulatory approvals.1,2 
The authorisation of pesticide active ingredients and the placement of pesticide 
products on the market in the European Union are governed by Regulation (EC) 
1107/2009 (Box 1).  
Decisions to authorise the use of pesticides are based mainly on a risk assessment of 
the active ingredient(s) and not on the whole pesticide product. The risk assessment is 
conducted with reference to a set of studies that must include studies of mammalian 
toxicity, ecotoxicity, metabolism, and production of potentially toxic metabolites, as well 
as models to predict the compound’s environmental concentrations and an estimate of 
a safe level of exposure for workers, consumers, and others. The assessment must, in 
theory, also include studies from the scientific peer-reviewed open literature on the 
active ingredient and its metabolites.  
The authorisation procedure for a new pesticide active substance starts when the 
applicant – the company that has commercial interest in placing the substance on the 
market – submits an “application” (dossier) with the required data (sometimes up to 
100,000 pages, as in the case of glyphosate) initially to a Member State of its choice 
(called the Rapporteur Member State or RMS for short) and to the European 
Commission. The RMS then provides an assessment. For renewals, the Commission, 
not the applicant, distributes the dossiers on pesticide active substances to the Member 
States on the basis of a country quota3. Most of the data in the dossiers are produced 
by pesticide companies and their contracted laboratories and are unpublished.  
                                            
1 Myers JP et al (2016). Concerns over use of glyphosate-based herbicides and risks associated with 
exposures: a consensus statement. Environmental Health 15:19. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-016-
0117-0  
2 Vandenberg LN et al (2012). Hormones and endocrine-disrupting chemicals: Low-dose effects and 
nonmonotonic dose responses. Endocr Rev 33(3): 378-455. 
3 PEST Committee (2018). EU authorization procedure for pesticides – application for approval of active 
substances and draft assessment reports: Preparatory questions with answers by Prof Dr Hensel, BfR. 
PEST Committee Meeting of 15 May 2018. 
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Box 1: Regulation 1107/2009 and hazard-based cut-off criteria  
The purpose of Regulation 1107/2009 is “to ensure a high level of protection of 
both human and animal health and the environment” and, in parallel, to 
safeguard “the competitiveness of Community agriculture”. Recognising that 
some population groups are more susceptible to pesticide exposure than 
others, it calls for particular attention to be paid “to the protection of vulnerable 
groups of the population, including pregnant women, infants and children”. It 
emphasises that the precautionary principle must be applied when there is a 
potential risk in the authorisation of a pesticide substance, even if there is no 
scientific consensus on the issue (recital 8).  
According to the regulation, an active substance shall be approved if “in the 
light of current scientific knowledge” it fulfils certain approval criteria and if it is 
expected that plant protection products containing the active substance and 
residues found in food and the environment will have no harmful effects on 
humans, animals, the environment and its ecosystems (Article 4.1).  
The criteria for authorisation are based on the hazardous properties of the 
substance – the potential for the substance to cause certain serious diseases – 
and are therefore hazard-based. According to Annex II of the regulation, “an 
active substance, safener or synergist” cannot be approved if it is carcinogenic, 
mutagenic, toxic to reproduction, or endocrine disruptive for humans. For the 
environment, it cannot be a POP (persistent organic pollutant), PBT (persistent, 
bioaccumulative, and toxic), endocrine disruptive to non-target organisms or 
toxic to bee colonies. These are known as hazard “cut-off” criteria because if 
the substance has any of these properties, as revealed in scientific tests, it must 
be automatically banned. However, in certain cases, “derogations” are 
permitted.  
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Box 1: continued 
The regulation addresses other toxic effects as well, such as the ability of the 
substance to cause neurotoxicity or immunotoxicity during the early life stages of 
mammalian development, or other critical effects of “particular significance”. 
However, these are not treated as “cut-offs” and therefore authorisation can be 
permitted with certain restrictions (for detailed information refer to Annex II, point 
3, Reg. 1107/2009).  
The hazard-based pesticide regulation resulted from a trialogue agreement 
between the European Parliament, European Council, and European 
Commission. The three parties recognised that hazard cut-off criteria are 
necessary to protect public health and the environment from serious harm. A 
study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and food Safety in 2008i, before the adoption of the regulation, 
concludes on the importance of the cut-off criteria: 
- Hazard-based cut-off criteria are justified where a preventive approach is 
needed. The absence of evidence from epidemiology studies does not equate 
to absence of effects. Accumulation of firm evidence can take many years, 
due to the long latency periods between low-level exposures and some health 
impacts. In the absence of such evidence and where negligibility of exposure 
cannot be assured, hazard-based criteria are important tools for prevention. 
- The proposed cut-off criteria reflect the seriousness of associated health 
effects. The health impacts associated with low-level chronic pesticide 
exposure are serious. The cut-off criteria reflect this and address the 
increasingly strong emerging evidence that certain chemicals can interact with 
the physiological systems of living organisms. 
 
iThe benefits of strict cut-off criteria on human health in relation to the proposal for a regulation 
concerning plant protection products. Milieu Ltd, European Parliament, Policy Department 
Economic and Scientific Policy, IP/A/ENVI/ST/2008-18. 
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For previously approved active substances for which renewed approval is requested, 
the application must be submitted at least three years before the expiration of the 
previous approval. The application is sent to a co-rapporteur Member State as well. A 
copy is also sent to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and to other Member 
States.  
The role of the RMS is to assess the completeness and admissibility of the dossier, the 
applicant’s requests to keep certain information confidential, and finally whether the 
dossier fulfils the approval criteria (Reg. 844/2012). This process involves 
communication exchanges with the applicant and where necessary also with EFSA and 
the Member States.  
Due to the size of the application, RMS do not have the capacity to go through every 
individual study, let alone to examine the original (raw) data of each one to confirm the 
applicant’s interpretation of the data. Furthermore, evaluation of these dossiers requires 
diverse types of scientific expertise. Ideally, they should be assessed by a diverse 
group of qualified experts – which, however, is rarely the case.  
Once it has finalised its assessment, RMS submits its draft or renewal assessment 
report (DAR or RAR) with its recommendations to the EU Commission and EFSA4. 
EFSA starts a peer review of the assessment by sharing it with the applicant, with 
Member States, and subsequently with the public, requesting comments by a specified 
deadline. EFSA staff collect all comments (including EFSA’s own) and invite the 
applicant to respond. EFSA then asks the RMS to review the applicant’s responses to 
check that the comments have been addressed and that there are no remaining 
information gaps. During this process, EFSA may organise teleconferences, expert 
groups, or expert consultations. Subsequently EFSA adopts a conclusion on whether 
the active substance is expected to meet the approval criteria set out in Reg. (EC) 
1107/2009. EFSA then communicates its conclusion to the applicant, Member States, 
and the EU Commission, giving the applicant some time to respond. Finally, EFSA 
publishes its opinion.  
                                            
4 EFSA is a European agency funded by the European Union that operates independently of the 
European legislative and executive institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament) and EU Member 
States. 
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In many cases, EFSA’s opinion includes a list of data gaps and/or concerns. If these 
data gaps cannot be resolved in a short period of time, they are requested to be 
submitted by a later date as “confirmatory information”. Under the current legislation, 
any concerns, especially a “critical area of concern”, should lead to a non-approval. 
However, in many cases, the area of concern is left to individual Member States to 
decide on, in their national authorisations.  
Following EFSA’s opinion, the EU Commission presents a review report and draft 
regulation, in most cases including the obligation for the applicant to submit 
confirmatory information in a few years’ time, to the Standing Committee on Plants, 
Animals, Food and Feed (SCoPAFF), consisting of representatives of Member States. 
The final decision is taken by this committee.  
The company’s delivery of the confirmatory information is often delayed. In many 
cases, no experimental data are provided, but reasoning and speculation are sent 
instead, which then typically results in the authorisation of those pesticides without the 
outstanding data gaps having been filled and/or with the specified areas of concern 
unresolved. Often these data gaps or areas of concern involve the impacts of pesticide 
and their metabolites on the environment, such as contamination of groundwater and 
toxic effects on non-target organisms (e.g. wild pollinators, birds and aquatic 
organisms).  
Once the active substance is approved, the applicant may register its product(s) in the 
EU countries of interest. Each product (formulation), containing one or more authorised 
active ingredient(s) together with other substances, is then assessed at the national 
level for its toxicity, through a much less rigorous process that focuses only on the 
acute toxicity (severe but time-limited effects that are not long-term). Therefore, the 
safety of the whole pesticide product, which is what people, animals and the 
environment are exposed to, is not thoroughly assessed, even though it is known that 
mixtures of chemicals may interact additively or synergistically and may increase the 
toxic potential of individual chemicals5. 
 
                                            
5 Kortenkamp A, Faust M (2018). Regulate to reduce chemical mixture risk. Science Magazine. 361: 224-
226. http://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6399/224   
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Despite the process being long and detailed, several pesticides that have passed 
through it and are being used today continue to pose risks to human health and the 
environment. Several trends indicate that humans and the environment are not being 
sufficiently protected from these harmful chemicals, including the abnormally high rate 
of development of diseases in farming families and residents in agricultural areas6, the 
high levels of pesticide residues detected in food7 and the environment8,9, and the 
decline of biodiversity and wildlife in agricultural areas10,11. 
In an effort to improve the risk assessment process for pesticides, we have collated in 
this document a description of the problems and have proposed appropriate solutions. 
Our aim is to help to improve the current system to ensure the high level of protection 
for humans, animals and the environment that is stipulated in the European pesticide 
Regulation (EC) 1107/2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6 Bellanger et al (2015). Neurobehavioral Deficits, Diseases, and Associated Costs of Exposure to 
Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals in the European Union. 
https://academic.oup.com/jcem/article/100/4/1256/2815066  
7 PAN Europe (2017). How many pesticides did you eat today? Plenty, according to European Food 
Safety Authority. April 13. https://www.pan-europe.info/press-releases/2017/04/how-many-pesticides-did-
you-eat-today-plenty-according-european-food-safety  
8 Stehle S, Schulz R (2015). Pesticide authorization in the EU — environment unprotected? 
Environmental Science and Pollution Research 22(24):19632–19647. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11356-015-5148-5  
9 Stehle S (2015). EU – European Union or Environment Unprotected? The EcoTox Blog. Sept 21. 
http://www.master-ecotoxicology.de/ecotox-blog/eu-european-union-or-environment-unprotected/  
10 Hallmann CA et al (2017). More than 75 percent decline over 27 years in total flying insect biomass in 
protected areas. PLOS ONE 12(10): e0185809. 
11 Woodcock BA et al (2015). Impacts of neonicotinoid use on long-term population changes in wild bees 
in England. Nature Communications 7:12459. DOI:10.1038/ncomms12459. 
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SHORTFALLS OF THE CURRENT EU PESTICIDE RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
 
1. Structural shortfalls 
1.1. Safety testing for risk assessment is carried out by the 
company that stands to profit from a favourable assessment 
Safety testing of a pesticide active substance is carried out by the pesticide companies 
themselves or their sub-contractors. Companies have a clear commercial interest in 
their pesticide being classified as safe in order to place it on the market. This is a 
conflict of interest that creates an enormous risk of bias in, for example, the design, 
conduct, and interpretation of studies. This bias could lead to toxic effects being 
hidden, misrepresented, or misinterpreted (as not exposure-related, spontaneously 
occurring, or irrelevant to humans, etc.).  
 
Proposed solutions 
Safety testing should be performed by laboratories that are independent of the industry. 
Tests should be commissioned not by industry but by a public independent body such 
as EFSA. The test material should be supplied to the laboratory by industry via EFSA 
or another official body. Industry should pay for the full costs of conducting and 
managing the required tests but must not be able to choose the laboratory or the 
scientists that carry out the studies, or the design and conduct of the studies.  
As long as the pesticide industry is allowed to keep data on toxicity and the 
environmental fate of pesticides confidential, the public will have no confidence in the 
safety of its products or the adequacy of the assessment and approval processes. This 
is a powerful reason why studies should be commissioned by public regulators and why 
all the data from testing and assessment processes should be in the public domain. 
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1.2. Lack of transparency in reporting of animal studies 
Currently there is no requirement that all safety tests done by industry are registered in 
advance and all their results reported. This makes it possible for industry to keep 
studies secret in cases where the outcome is unfavourable. Applicants can “cherry-
pick” which studies to include or which adverse effects to report, and which to conceal, 
in order to influence the conclusion of the assessment.  
 
Proposed solutions 
All regulatory studies on test substances (whether or not they are used in the final 
delivered dossier) should be registered centrally before they commence and the results 
should be published online (see point 1.3). In case of authorisation renewal, all older 
studies used as data requirements should also be registered. This is addressed to 
some degree in the Commission’s proposal on transparency12 as part of its response to 
the EU Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) on glyphosate. In this respect we support an initiative 
towards transparency with the following conditions:  
• Data from a test that was not registered prior to the initiation of the experimental 
work cannot be used in a risk evaluation afterwards.  
• No compound or product should be authorised unless all data from all registered 
studies are submitted. 
Such a procedure has been developed in the framework of the Clinical Trial Regulation 
EU 536/2014 in response to fraud and selective data reporting by the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
                                            
12 EU Commission (2018). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain 
amending Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 [on general food law], Directive 2001/18/EC [on the deliberate 
release into the environment of GMOs], Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 [on GM food and feed], 
Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 [on feed additives], Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 [on smoke 
flavourings], Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 [on food contact materials], Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 
[on the common authorisation procedure for food additives, food enzymes and food flavourings], 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 [on plant protection products] and Regulation (EU) No 2015/2283 [on 
novel foods]. 11 April.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1523604766591&uri=COM:2018:179:FIN  
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1.3. Lack of transparency of industry studies 
The full reports of regulatory toxicity studies related to data requirements for pesticide 
approval are generally unpublished and cannot be evaluated by independent experts or 
the general public.  
In April 2018, as part of its response to the ECI on glyphosate, the Commission 
proposed13 that these studies be published by EFSA upon receipt, as a move towards 
transparency. Although we welcome this step, we do not agree with the caveat in the 
proposal14 specifying that disclosure of data will be weighed against the rights of 
commercial applicants and that if disclosed, these data may only be used and quoted 
after requesting and gaining specific authorisation from the private companies that 
provide the data15,16. Based on the proposal, the companies would be allowed to claim 
confidentiality based on “intellectual property”, or EFSA could refuse disclosure.  
The pesticide industry has systematically fought meaningful disclosure, arguing that 
these studies could be misused by their competitors in an application outside Europe. 
Thus, they are likely to continue to withhold permission for independent scientists and 
consumer organisations who wish to publish findings. 
 
Proposed solutions 
The full study reports, including test methods, results, and discussion, from studies 
used in the regulatory assessment of pesticides should be made publicly available in an 
easily searchable form to allow unrestricted independent scrutiny. Applicants should not 
                                            
13 EU Commission (2018). Ibid. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1523604766591&uri=COM:2018:179:FIN  
14 See p. 27: Article 32e amending Article 38, General Food: “The disclosure to the public of the 
information mentioned [...] shall not be considered as an explicit or implicit permission or license for the 
relevant data and information and their content to be used, reproduced, or otherwise exploited and its 
use by third parties shall not engage the responsibility of the European Union.” 
15 Corporate Europe Observatory (2018). Better access to industry studies used in EFSA risk 
assessments insufficient without usage and quotation rights. April 11. 
https://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2018/04/better-access-industry-studies-used-efsa-risk-
assessments-insufficient-without  
16 European Citizens’ Intitiative Press Release: Will business secrecy keep defeating the public’s right to 
know on food safety? September 2018. https://www.pan-europe.info/press-releases/2018/09/eci-press-
release-will-business-secrecy-keep-defeating-public%E2%80%99s-right-know  
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be allowed to hide publicly relevant information behind claims that they constitute 
confidential business information.  
Scientists and others must be allowed to examine and cite these data in scientific 
publications and elsewhere, without being required to obtain the consent of private 
companies whose primary objective may not be the protection of health and the 
environment, but to make a profit17. 
 
1.4. Conflicts of interest in EFSA and national authorities  
To ensure the impartiality of its staff and external advisors, EFSA has an independence 
policy for “professionals contributing to its operations”18. However, national authorities 
that take part in risk assessment procedures (either as RMS or by commenting and 
voting on the authorizations of active substances) are not obliged by EU law to have an 
independence policy or to declare conflict of interests, so people with ties to the 
industry may be involved in the Member States’ decisions.  
Moreover, even the independence policy of EFSA, which was revised in June 2017, still 
contains loopholes that will fail to exclude some people with conflicts of interest from 
the risk assessment process19.  
The current loopholes in risk assessment in relation to potential conflicts of interest 
include: 
• EFSA forbids members of its scientific panels from being employed at, or having 
direct financial interests in, companies falling under the agency’s remit. However, 
regarding all other links to industry, it only applies a two-year cooling-off period – and 
this only applies to matters falling under the specific mandate of the relevant panel or 
committee and not to EFSA’s remit as a public food safety agency20. Experts 
                                            
17 Cf E Millstone et al (1994), ‘Plagiarism or protecting public health?’, Nature, 371(6499):647-8 
18 EFSA (2017). EFSA’s policy on independence.  
https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/corporate_publications/files/policy_independence.pdf  
19 Corporate Europe Observatory (2017). ‘New EFSA independence policy likely rejects most 
Parliament demands’. June 22. https://corporateeurope.org/efsa/2017/06/new-efsa-independence-
policy-likely-rejects-most-parliament-demands 
20 EFSA’s policy on independence, pp. 6-7: “This is why having worked as a self-employed professional 
or as an employee for a legal entity pursuing private or commercial interests in the sphere of the relevant 
expert group is deemed incompatible with membership of the Scientific Committee, Scientific Panels and 
Working Groups for two years after the conflicting activity has ended. This cooling off period applies to all 
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working with, or funded by, the food industry on a given topic can therefore join an 
EFSA expert group as long as it is on a different topic. For example, an expert 
whose research on a food additive is funded by a chemical company that also 
makes pesticides would not be excluded from EFSA’s Panel on Plant Protection 
Products and their Residues (PPR Panel), even if his or her collaboration with 
industry took place less than two years before or continues into the present. This 
approach fails to take account of the chemical company’s interests as a whole. For 
example, the independence policy would miss to capture work done by experts on 
risk assessment methodologies that are not product-specific, even though the 
chemical company’s interests as a whole could benefit from weak or pro-industry-
biased methodologies. 
• In relation to research funding, even when experts are funded by a company for 
research on the same topic as the one the panel is looking at, EFSA would accept 
the expert on the panel as long as the funding they receive did not exceed 25% of 
the annual research budget that they manage. This is very important, given that 
research funding is the largest source of financial conflicts of interest at EFSA. 
• EFSA does not have the authority to exclude Member States’ experts with 
conflicts of interest from involvement in risk assessment (as RMS or in 
commenting during the RA procedure). Over 80% of Member State experts 
involved in the glyphosate assessment refused to disclose their names to 
the public, so their interests could not be checked21. 
• EFSA staff are included in limited sections of EFSA’s independence policy, 
hence not all EFSA staff have to publish their declarations of interest online. 
• The same RMS may assess a compound more than once (as with glyphosate). In 
such cases, national experts involved in multiple authorisations are in effect marking 
their own homework. This is a problem because experts may be reluctant to 
disagree with their own past decisions. An advantage of avoiding this situation is that 
diversity of opinions can help reduce bias and challenge entrenched positions. 
                                            
managerial roles, employment and consultancies, even of an occasional nature, membership in a 
scientific advisory body and research funding on matters falling under the mandate of the relevant EFSA 
scientific group” (our emphasis). 
21 Corporate Europe Observatory (2016). Glyphosate: one pesticide, many problems. June 28. 
https://corporateeurope.org/food-and-agriculture/2016/06/glyphosate-one-pesticide-many-problems  
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Proposed solutions 
EFSA should close the loopholes in its independence policy. Specifically: 
• Research funding that an expert receives from a company falling under EFSA’s 
regulatory remit should be considered a conflict of interest, regardless of the amount 
involved. 
• All experts’ interests should be considered in relation to EFSA’s remit as a whole.  
• All EFSA staff – not only management – involved in any step of the risk assessment 
procedure should publicly declare their interests. EFSA management should ensure 
that the agency’s independence policy de facto applies to EFSA staff every time they 
request permission to perform “external activities”. 
• EFSA staff should be barred from accepting any travel funding to industry-sponsored 
workshops or meetings. Attendance of staff at any industry-sponsored workshop or 
meeting should be reviewed for value to the agency and paid for only with 
government or European Commission funding. 
• The current two-year cooling-off period on industry interests before an external 
expert can be appointed to an EFSA panel should be extended to five years22. 
The strengthened EFSA independence policy should be applied to all experts involved 
in all stages of the risk assessment, including national experts from Member States 
involved as representatives of a RMS or as providing comments in the risk assessment 
of an active substance. Experts involved in any EU-wide or Member State pesticide risk 
assessment should not be allowed to maintain anonymity. 
The same RMS should not assess a substance twice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
22 The EU Parliament has requested this in the yearly budget discussions. 
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1.5.  Conflicts of interest in risk assessment methodology design  
Various scientific guidance documents on methodologies for the risk assessment of 
pesticides have been developed23 by different responsible bodies within EFSA, as well 
as by divisions of the Commission, such as DG SANTE’s pesticide unit.  
The different types of EFSA guidance documents and their developer bodies include:  
• “Cross-cutting guidance”, developed by EFSA Scientific Committee 
• “Sector-specific guidance documents”, developed by EFSA expert panels such 
as the PPR Panel, or EFSA staff units  
• “Other assessment methodologies”, developed by EFSA staff and peer reviewed 
by independent experts. 
The guidance documents and opinions prepared by EFSA and Commission expert 
panels and committees are the basis for EU and national evaluations. EFSA staff have 
to use these guidance documents in their evaluations. The guidance documents will, 
however, only be implemented at the national level if the Standing Committee on 
Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (SCoPAFF) ‘takes note’ of them. Guidance documents 
aimed at protecting bees and birds, and representing the newest scientific insights, 
have been halted for years through SCoPAFF’s failure to ‘take note’ of them. Thus 
SCoPAFF effectively dominates the evaluation process.  
The pesticide industry has a major influence on the development of the guidance 
documents and some of the documents have been developed by people with 
commercial interests. For example, according to Corporate Europe Observatory, in 
2017 nearly half (46%) of the experts sitting on EFSA expert panels, which are 
responsible for “Sector-specific guidance documents”, had ties to the regulated 
industries24. Ten out of 21 members of the PPR Panel had a financial conflict of 
interest.  
                                            
23 EFSA (undated). Guidance and other assessment methodology documents. 
https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/methodology/guidance  
24 Corporate Europe Observatory (2017). Nearly half the experts from the European Food Safety 
Authority have financial conflicts of interest. 14 June. 
https://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2017/06/nearly-half-experts-european-food-safety-authority-
have-financial-conflicts  
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Even if people with conflicts of interest were removed from EFSA roles with immediate 
effect, the legacy of flawed methodologies that they helped to develop would remain. 
Such methodologies can put public health and the environment at risk (PAN Europe, 
2018)25. For example, the EFSA Scientific Committee has ruled that substances that 
are both genotoxic and carcinogenic can have safe levels. This view is contrary to the  
opinion of numerous scientific authorities26, as well as being incompatible with the 
precautionary principle and Regulation (EC) 1107/2009, which stipulates that a 
carcinogenic substance can only be used if it has no “contact with humans”. The risk 
assessment tool that the EFSA Scientific Committee used to reach its decision to allow 
genotoxic carcinogens was the ‘Margin of Exposure’ (MoE) approach.27 This approach 
was developed by EFSA in a collaboration with the industry-funded lobby group ILSI 
over many years28,29. The MoE approach is a self-interested corporate innovation 
masquerading as an objective scientific concept.  
In addition, the scientific understanding of chemical toxicology evolves rapidly and it is 
vital to ensure that risk assessment methodologies are regularly updated to take 
account of the current state of the science. 
 
Proposed solutions 
Risk assessment policy concerns the non-scientific assumptions that invariably frame 
any risk assessment. Assumptions include substantive, procedural and interpretative 
                                            
25 Eg PAN Europe (2018). Industry writing its own rules. https://www.pan-europe.info/sites/pan-
europe.info/files/public/resources/reports/industry-writings-its-own-rules-pdf.pdf  
26 Committee on Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment (2012). 
A strategy for the risk assessment of chemical carcinogens, p.4: “In the absence of information to the 
contrary, it is prudent to assume that chemicals which are genotoxic and carcinogenic have the potential 
to alter DNA at any level of exposure and that such change could lead to tumour development. 
Therefore, any level of exposure is considered to carry some degree of carcinogenic risk.” 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31587
8/Strategy_for_the_risk_assessment_of_chemical_carcinogens.pdf  
27 EFSA (2012). Statement on the applicability of the Margin of Exposure approach for the safety 
assessment of impurities1 which are both genotoxic and carcinogenic in substances added to food/feed. 
EFSA Journal 2012;10(3):2578. 
28 EFSA. 2006. EFSA/WHO international conference with support of ILSI Europe on risk assessment of 
compounds that are both genotoxic and carcinogenic. 16-18 November 2005, Brussels, Belgium. EFSA 
meeting summary report. ISBN: 92-9199-028-0. 
29 Barlow S et al (2006). Risk assessment of substances that are both genotoxic and carcinogenic: 
Report of an International Conference organized by EFSA and WHO with support of ILSI Europe. Food 
and Chemical Toxicology 44 (2006) 1636–1650. 
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factors. Substantive assumptions relate, for example, to what is deemed to be a ‘risk’ or 
‘harm’, what is outside the terms of reference, and which data should be deemed 
relevant. Procedural considerations relate to the ways in which risk assessment should 
be designed and conducted. Interpretative assumptions concern the ways in which 
data should be interpreted: for example, under what conditions it may be appropriate to 
treat data from animal and in vitro studies as relevant to human risks and when may it 
be appropriate to discount them. An example of an assumption that is both procedural 
and interpretative is the policymakers’ answer to the question of whether risk assessors 
should be more concerned to avoid false negatives or false positives, or whether they 
should be equally concerned to identify and avoid both30.  
Such risk assessment policy judgements should be decided by risk managers in 
advance of the risk assessment and should be in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Codex Alimentarius Commission31. The risk assessment policy should 
be established by risk managers (Commission) in consultation with risk assessors and 
all other interested parties, to ensure that the risk assessments are adequate to fulfil 
EFSA’s mission to protect public and environmental health and that they are conducted 
transparently. The possible alternative outputs of the risk assessment should be 
defined.  
Scientific guidance documents for the risk assessment should be reviewed by the risk 
managers for adherence to the risk regulation policy, and also by a panel of high level, 
actively publishing scientists who are independent from industry. The scientists should 
screen the guidance documents for bias, non-scientific and outdated assumptions, and 
violations of the precautionary principle, and should revise them independently of the 
regulatory authorities. 
It is also essential to revisit the “legacy” of risk assessment methods developed by 
industry-funded and industry-linked projects and experts and revise them according to 
the above principles and procedures. 
 
                                            
30 E Millstone et al, Risk-assessment policies: differences across jurisdictions, Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies, Seville, Spain, EUR Number: 23259 EN, April 2008, available at 
http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=1562  
31 Codex Alimentarius Commission (2018). Procedural Manual, 26th edition, pp 124-130. 
http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/I8608EN  
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1.6. There is a reported shortage of independent experts to carry out 
risk assessment 
EFSA reports to have difficulty32 in attracting enough external experts for its panels and 
working groups who are independent from the industry sector to fulfil regulatory roles. 
This is certainly due to inadequate financial compensation for their work at EFSA, 
considering the demands of such a role. But it is also a consequence of the EU and 
national research policies incentivising academia to collaborate more and more with 
industry (for instance, via public-private partnerships). This trend drives scientists’ work 
towards industrial priorities and limits their freedom to explore research questions that 
could produce results that undermine commercial interests (see also point 1.8).  
Similarly, Member States, either in their role as RMS or as providers of comments 
during consultations, often lack the human resources to carry out the thorough review 
that the dossiers require. 
 
Proposed solutions 
EFSA should actively recruit independent experts, who should be adequately 
recompensed. EFSA’s budget should include fair compensation for experts and, when 
needed, their employers. The recent EC proposal foresees a 75% budget increase for 
EFSA33. A proportion of these funds could be used for this purpose. 
EU and national research policies should allocate sufficient funding for public research 
projects to evaluate the possible risks from pesticide products and develop 
methodologies for their safety assessment, without any industry involvement (see 1.8), 
and establish public sector capacity and expertise in these fields.  
Member States should give incentives to academia, including recompense for time 
spent, to make sure that it can fully contribute to the work of EFSA and its risk 
assessments. 
                                            
32 EU Commission (2018). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain 
amending Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 [on general food law]...  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1523604766591&uri=COM:2018:179:FIN    
33 EU Commission (2018). Ibid. 
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1.7. Current risk assessment policies prioritize industry interests, 
rather than human and animal health and the environment 
The Commission is tasked with the role of risk manager. As such, it should provide 
EFSA and other risk assessment agencies in Member States with a clear mandate to 
deliver a risk assessment that would provide a high level of protection for human and 
animal health and the environment, and that honours the precautionary principle, as 
stipulated in the EU pesticide Regulation (EC) 1107/2009. 
Instead, the Commission has in some cases become an obstacle to achieving these 
goals. It often operates unaccountably and non-transparently, prioritising the interests 
of industry over the public interest.  
For example, the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (SCoPAFF), 
which deals with the authorization of pesticides, is composed of representatives of all 
Member States and presided over by the European Commission’s DG SANTE. 
SCoPAFF approved a set of criteria that were supposed to identify pesticides that are 
endocrine disruptors (EDCs). But those criteria were criticised by experts in the field of 
endocrinology for demanding too high a level of proof34. Consequently they would fail to 
identify pesticides that are EDCs and fail to protect people and the environment from 
the adverse effects of these substances – protection that is required by the pesticide 
regulation35,36. The actions of the Commission in its role as risk manager therefore 
compromise the risk assessments of pesticides that have endocrine disrupting 
properties. 
Many risk assessments are carried out on the basis of unacknowledged 
presuppositions that prioritise the interests of industry and the agribusiness lobby over 
human and animal health and the environment. For example, evidence of harm from 
industry-commissioned animal tests is routinely played down, ignored, or discounted by 
risk assessors and risk managers as not sufficiently strong to justify a ban or 
restrictions in the use of a substance. This tendency arises in part from a lack of an 
                                            
34 Endocrine Society (2017). Joint letter to EU Member State ministers. June 15. https://www.edc-eu-
tour.info/sites/edc-eu-
tour.info/files/field/document_file/joint_ese_espe_es_statement_on_edc_criteria.pdf  
35 EDC Free Europe (2017). EDC-Free campaigners criticize vote on first ever EDC criteria. July 10. 
http://www.edc-free-europe.org/edc-free-campaigners-criticize-vote-on-first-ever-edc-criteria/  
36 PAN Europe (2017). Endocrine disrupting pesticides in European food. https://bit.ly/2KEQ2A1  
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explicit interpretative risk assessment policy that is strongly protective of health and the 
environment being established in advance of the risk assessment. 
There is also a tendency for EFSA to embed political decisions in its own guidance 
documents or for EFSA’s opinions to be uncritically adopted into policy – but this should 
not be EFSA’s role. EFSA’s role should be to deliver scientific risk assessments that 
meet the mandate given to it, to provide a high level of protection for human and animal 
health and the environment. 
 
Proposed solutions 
Risk assessment policy should be established by risk managers (i.e. the Commission 
and in some cases also the Council of Ministers) in advance of risk assessment.  
While the pesticide regulation assumes an implicit risk assessment policy that 
prioritises a high level of protection for public health and the environment, this aspect of 
the regulation has not been fulfilled in practice. Risk managers have failed to impose 
this legislative mandate on the risk assessors and the risk assessors have failed to 
consistently deliver opinions that respect the EU’s chosen level of protection. 
Consequently risk assessment policy should be made more explicit and precautionary. 
With this in mind, all risk assessment policy documents should be developed, decided 
and applied in accordance with the provisions of Codex Alimentarius on risk 
assessment policy.37 We apply these provisions to the case of pesticide risk 
assessment and management as follows:  
• Determination of risk assessment policy should be included as a specific component 
of risk management that should take place prior to the risk assessment. 
• The Commission should take explicit responsibility for providing risk assessment 
policy to EFSA, and should do so transparently and accountably, with the oversight 
of the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The benchmarks that it sets should 
not be ‘invisible’ and negotiated in secret between government and industry. Instead 
they should be established in open consultation with risk assessors and all other 
                                            
37 Codex Alimentarius Commission (2018). Procedural Manual, 26th edition, pp 124-126. 
http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/I8608EN  
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interested parties. All decision-makers should be identified and held accountable for 
their choices. This procedure aims at ensuring that the risk assessment is 
systematic, complete, unbiased, and transparent. 
• Only if and when the above conditions are met and the Commission operates 
transparently and accountably, adheres to the relevant guidance, and fully accepts 
its legislative obligation to prioritise public health and the environment, should it be 
given the authority to set the mandate for the risk assessors. We firmly oppose the 
Commission’s being given any authority or public mandate in the absence of these 
conditions being met. 
• The mandate given by the Commission as risk manager to the risk assessors should 
clearly prioritise a high level of protection for public health and the environment, as 
well as adherence to the EU’s formal policy on precaution. 
• Where necessary, risk managers should ask risk assessors to evaluate the potential 
changes in risk resulting from different risk management options. 
 
1.8. Industry evaluates and prepares its own risk assessment 
methodologies 
Many risk assessment methods are evaluated or prepared in EU research programmes 
like FP7 and Horizon 2020 in public-private partnerships. Examples include: 
• ACROPOLIS, a programme funded under FP7 that developed methodologies for 
assessing the cumulative risk assessment of pesticides.38 The project 
coordinator, Jacob van Klaveren, acknowledged that the objective of the project 
was to “alleviate consumer concerns” and “to prove that pesticide use is safe” – 
although the objective should have been to determine whether their use is safe. 
Key people involved in the project, including van Klaveren, had interests in the 
pesticide industry, such as links with the industrial lobby group ILSI. Such 
interests conflict with the interests of consumer and environmental protection. 
The project promoted a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tool to try to give 
quantitative answers in conditions of considerable uncertainty. PAN EU stated 
                                            
38 PAN EU (2014). A poisonous injection. https://www.pan-
europe.info/old/Resources/Reports/PANE%20-%202014%20-%20A%20Poisonous%20injection.pdf  
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that PRA was invoked “to allow a certain level of health damage to people in an 
attempt to ‘neutralise’ the coming policy on [cumulative risk assessment]”, which 
industry was unable to stop39. 
• SEURAT40, another EU-funded program, argued for use of a risk assessment 
methodology called AOP, or adverse outcome pathway. AOP is a “mode of 
action” approach that industry has promoted for years, notably as an alternative 
to animal testing. Scientists apply AOP to guess whether adverse effects will 
develop in the body following chemical exposure, and if so, how. PAN EU stated 
in a report that AOP should not be used as a final decision-making method 
because it provides “an unknown level of prediction and cannot guarantee the 
high level of protection that is required by EU law”. It is speculative, not 
empirical. People involved in this project had links with ILSI41. 
Collaboration between industry and regulators to prepare or evaluate the rules for 
industry constitutes a clear conflict of interest because the pesticides industry is able to 
choose the standards against which its own ‘homework’ is to be ‘marked’. There is a 
fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the interests of the companies trying to 
place those products on the market and the public interest in health and environmental 
protection. In the area of tobacco, such irreconcilable interests are recognized by the 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which was designed to protect 
public health policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco 
industry42. 
 
 
 
                                            
39 van Klaveren J (2011). Pesticide assessment. ACROPOLIS. https://acropolis-
eu.com/object_binary/o4422_ACROPOLIS_03.pdf  
40 SEURAT-1 (2018). Welcome. http://www.seurat-1.eu/  
41 PAN EU (2016). AOP: The Trojan horse for industry lobby tools? https://www.pan-
europe.info/sites/pan-europe.info/files/public/resources/reports/pan-europe-aop-report-8.8-dec-16.pdf  
42 FCTC – WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2008). Guidelines for implementation of 
Article 5.3. Protection of public health policies with respect to tobacco control from commercial and other 
vested interests of the tobacco industry. Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its third session 
(decision FCTC/COP3(7)). 
http://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/Guidelines_Article_5_3_English.pdf     
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Proposed solutions 
When the EU and Commission fund research projects that work on risk assessment 
methods, the experts involved should NOT be employed by, or otherwise linked to, the 
regulated companies, as is often the case currently. EU research programmes should 
fund independent academics without conflicts of interest with industry to inform policy-
makers’ decisions about risk assessment guidelines and methods. 
Regulators should decide on the rules for risk assessment independently of industry 
through a transparent decision-making process. Risk managers should take explicit and 
accountable responsibility for setting fundamental guidelines, to which risk assessors 
should conform (or give reasons for not conforming). Those guidelines should not be 
invisible and negotiated in secret between government and industry but should be 
decided by risk managers in open meetings, in deliberations with all interested parties, 
in order that decision-makers can be made democratically accountable for their 
choices.  
In the interim, while industry-linked people are still involved in EU-funded programmes, 
the scope of industry’s involvement should be fully disclosed, clearly defined, and 
limited. Industry should have no role in setting risk assessment policies, beyond that of 
a stakeholder that can respond to public consultations in the same way as a concerned 
NGO. Industry should not participate in decision-making or in selecting or providing 
members of expert panels. 
 
1.9. There is no meaningful post-authorisation monitoring 
Despite the provisions of Regulation (EC) 1107/2009, there is hardly any post-
authorisation monitoring of the impact of pesticide use in the EU member states to 
ensure that the rules and their implementation are adequate to protect humans, 
animals, and the environment. Examples of the monitoring that should be routinely 
carried out (but often is not) include the volume and type of pesticides used by farmers, 
the location, and what restrictions were applied; environmental levels of pesticides; and 
exposure levels of farm animals and humans, including bystanders and residents living 
near sprayed fields. Moreover, there is a trend in EU Member States’ governments to 
cut the workforce of environmental policing agencies, which makes the situation worse. 
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Proposed solutions 
• Each Member State should implement routine national monitoring for human, farm 
animal, and environmental levels of pesticides and outcomes. Protection goals 
should be established to determine when exposures exceed health targets. On a 
case-by-case basis, epidemiological studies should be commissioned. Industry 
should pay the costs of both monitoring and testing but these should be managed 
and conducted by independent bodies. 
• Routine national inspections of farmers’ pesticide use should be carried out. 
• Data on pesticide use in the EU as a whole, and at the level of each Member State, 
should be publicly available. These data should include the names of pesticides 
used, as well as volumes, locations, and frequency. National authorities should set 
up a central register to receive complaints by citizens and farmers on pesticide 
exposure, relating to pesticide drift, illegal or even legal uses, driven by health or 
other concerns. If complaints reveal a negative impact upon health or the 
environment related to the use of certain pesticides, then national authorities are 
currently legally obliged to review such authorisations and notify the Commission 
and the other Member States43. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
43 See Regulation 1107/2009: for formulations, see Article 44, “Withdrawal or amendment of an 
authorisation”; for active substances, see Article 21, “Review of approval”. 
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2. Methodological shortfalls – Evidence generation and 
analysis 
 
2.1. Test methodologies are outdated and testing is incomplete 
Some of the current regulatory testing protocols are conceptually and technically out of 
date and therefore not sensitive enough. This increases the potential for serious 
adverse effects of pesticides to go undetected. In addition, even the available 
regulatory safety tests for pesticides on endocrine disruption, immunotoxicity, and 
developmental neurotoxicity are seldom applied. For example, in the data requirements 
for pesticides with endocrine disrupting properties, additional assessment of neurotoxic 
or immunotoxic effects in long-term life-cycle experiments that cover potential harm 
from exposure during sensitive periods of life remains optional.  
 
Proposed solutions 
• Data requirements should be modernised to establish regulatory safety testing of 
sufficient sensitivity. Major adverse health effects that are currently not sufficiently 
covered (e.g. endocrine disruption, developmental neurotoxicity and immunotoxicity, 
adipogenicity and metabolic disorders, and epigenetic effects) should be included. 
New and/or additional test protocols will be needed in order to form a complete 
toxicity assessment.  
• A protocol covering most of the adverse outcomes at once in a single experiment 
could save testing time and spare animals, as compared to existing guidelines where 
different endpoints are tested in separate studies (e.g. Manservisi et al. 2017)44.  
• For pesticides already on the market, endpoints that are missing from older test 
guidelines should be addressed before approvals can be renewed.  
                                            
44 Manservisi F, Babot Marquillas C, Buscaroli A, Huff J, Lauriola M, Mandrioli D, Manservigi M, 
Panzacchi S, Silbergeld EK, Belpoggi F (2017). An integrated experimental design for the assessment of 
multiple toxicological end points in rat bioassays. Environ Health Perspect 125:289–295. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/EHP419 
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• Sufficient flexibility must be built into the process so that new insights into serious 
adverse effects on health can promptly be taken into consideration, even when they 
are not specifically covered by regulatory data requirements (e.g. epigenetic 
changes and behavioural effects and disorders). 
 
2.2. Incomplete dossiers and assessment reports are wrongly 
accepted 
Currently the Rapporteur Member States illegally approve the admissibility of 
incomplete dossiers/applications. Common data gaps include the adverse effects of 
metabolites, impurities, effects on non-target organisms (e.g. birds, fish, and frogs).  
It is EFSA’s role to identify these data gaps, along with any areas of concern. However, 
the EU Commission (DG SANTE) and Member States often do not wait for the missing 
information to be supplied but approve the authorisation of the substance in question, 
requesting the missing information to be submitted at a later date as “confirmatory 
information” (within a period of several months, depending on the missing data). In 
some cases, even after this period has elapsed, the applicant asks for further 
extensions or delivers confirmatory information that is incomplete.  
Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 Article 6(f) indicates that “derogations” should only be 
allowed in exceptional circumstances (in cases where new data requirements were 
adopted during the evaluation or for information considered confirmatory in nature) – 
but currently derogations are applied on a large scale, allowing chemicals market 
access even when they do not comply with the legal requirements.  
 
Proposed solutions 
• Completeness of the dossiers should be ensured by a single body (e.g. EFSA), in a 
standardised way. 
• The Rapporteur Member State must comply with its obligations under EU law and 
reject applications (dossiers) that do not include all the data required by Regulation 
(EC) 1107/2009 from the start, following the principle, “No data, no market”. At a 
later stage in the application procedure, the EU Commission is also obliged by Reg. 
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(EC) 1107/2009 to refuse the authorisation of pesticides with data gaps or areas of 
concern identified by EFSA. 
• Pesticides that were previously authorised with outstanding data gaps and lack of 
confirmatory data should be immediately re-evaluated.  
 
2.3. Harmful pesticides continue to be authorised in the EU without 
restrictions 
Pesticides for which the body of evidence indicates certain harmful effects to humans, 
animals, or the environment, or for which EFSA identifies areas of concern that remain 
unresolved, continue to be approved and used, against the provisions of Regulation 
(EC) 1107/2009 and the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive (2009/128/EC). 
Member States argue that the pesticide in question is too important for agriculture and 
will impact the competitiveness of the EU in the international market, as foreign 
exporters may request an ‘import tolerance’ for active substances in their food products 
that are not in use in EU. Such pesticides are often authorised together with 
recommendations to restrict certain uses or apply mitigation measures (e.g. to set 
buffer zones), but the implementation and effectiveness of these measures are never 
verified. The precautionary principle enshrined in EU law is not applied.  
 
Proposed solutions 
• All pesticides for which the body of evidence indicates any harmful effects to 
humans, animals, or the environment, or for which EFSA indicates areas of concern, 
should be banned, or their use restricted. In case of uncertainty, the precautionary 
principle should be applied.  
• In all cases the risk assessor and the risk manager (RMS, EFSA and the 
Commission) should ensure that Member States fully comply with the Sustainable 
Use of Pesticides Directive 2009/128/EC, under which farmers should: 
o Use synthetic chemical pesticides only as a last resort, giving preference to 
non-chemical alternatives or to pesticides of low risk 
o Implement strict mitigation measures (e.g. buffer zones) 
o Reduce volumes of pesticide use, and 
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o Explicitly adopt and implement a policy of substituting less safe compounds 
with safer ones.  
• The Commission should ensure that each Member State has a Farm Advisory 
Service (FAS), with the expertise to inform farmers on pest management methods 
other than the use of pesticides.  
• EU farmers should be motivated to improve their practices without being ‘punished’ 
by markets. Thus, the Commission should ban imported products that contain 
residues of non-approved pesticides, or that contain residues of any pesticide 
exceeding the EU’s permitted maximum residue levels, with no exceptions. 
 
2.4. In some cases, the RMS takes the applicant’s assessment of the 
evidence at face value 
In some cases, the RMS takes the applicant’s assessment at face value and/or limits 
the remit of its assessment to the applicant’s assessment. For example, in the 
glyphosate assessment, the BfR (German health institute) missed significant increases 
in tumours in glyphosate-exposed animals45 as a result of initially relying on industry’s 
own evaluation of the studies without performing the necessary check of comparing the 
summaries with the original studies46. 
 
Proposed solutions 
All RMS must be mindful of their legal obligations under Regulation 1107/2009: 
• According to Article 11.2: “The rapporteur Member State shall make an independent, 
objective and transparent assessment in the light of current scientific and technical 
knowledge” 
• The assessment itself should not be of the industry assessment but of (Article 11.1) 
“whether the active substance can be expected to meet the approval criteria”. 
                                            
45 GMWatch (2017). EU authorities broke their own rules and brushed aside evidence of cancer to keep 
glyphosate on the market. July 13. https://gmwatch.org/en/news/latest-news/17724    
46 Clausing P (2017). Glyphosate and cancer: Authorities systematically breach regulations. 
GLOBAL2000. https://gmwatch.org/files/GLO_02_Glyphosat_EN.pdf (p.3). 
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2.5. Peer-reviewed scientific literature is used in a limited, biased, 
and unintegrated way 
The application dossier for a pesticide active substance must by law include 
independent scientific peer-reviewed open literature47. However, the literature reviews 
carried out by industry often omit large numbers of academic studies48. The few 
academic studies that are found are then either excluded from the evaluation as non-
relevant for reasons that do not relate to their scientific relevance to the question at 
stake (e.g. the Klimisch criteria49 are used to exclude results originating from non-GLP 
or OECD-protocol studies) – or they are given very limited weight as a source of 
information about the toxicity of chemicals.  
In contrast, studies compliant with GLP (Good Laboratory Practice) and OECD test 
guidelines are by default accepted as being reliable, relevant, and adequate for the risk 
assessment, even when the results are poorly reported. There is almost no integrated 
assessment of regulatory and scientific studies; instead, industry regulatory studies are 
played off against studies conducted by researchers who are independent from 
industry. 
 
Proposed solutions 
The Rapporteur Member State (RMS) and the Commission must ensure that the 
applicant complies with its obligation to submit all published and unpublished literature 
on the active substance being considered for authorisation renewal, using the 
                                            
47 Regulation 1107/2009, Article 8(5) and EFSA (2011). Submission of scientific peer-reviewed open 
literature for the approval of pesticide active substances under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. 
48 PAN Europe (2014). Missed and Dismissed.  
https://www.pan-europe.info/old/Resources/Reports/PANE%20-%202014%20-
%20Missed%20and%20dismissed.pdf  
49 The “Klimisch criteria” are named after the employee of BASF who published them in a journal. They 
evaluate the relevance and reliability of studies based on whether they conform to OECD test guidelines 
and are GLP compliant. However, adherence to OECD test guidelines and GLP does not mean that a 
study is better than a non-OECD/GLP study published in a peer-reviewed journal, neither does it 
guarantee the quality of interpretation of the findings. And the “Klimisch criteria” are not a scientifically 
valid standard for evaluating the quality of a study from the independent peer-reviewed literature. 
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fundamental principles of systematic review50,51. If properly applied, systematic review 
methods provide objectivity and transparency to the process of collecting and 
synthesizing scientific evidence in a strategic manner, enabling unbiased conclusions 
to be reached on the impact of pesticides on human and environmental health.  
In systematic reviews, relevance should be defined in terms of the extent to which the 
outcomes, exposures, and (where applicable) the population studied are informative of 
potential health risks in humans or non-target organisms. For a fully transparent and 
systematic review of the scientific literature, the following points should be taken into 
consideration: 
• It is scientifically unacceptable to dismiss studies simply because they do not 
adhere to OECD protocols and GLP rules, which are designed for industry studies. 
OECD/GLP studies and academic studies should be considered to be 
complementary in identifying the potential and actual effects of pesticides. 
Academic studies that are not constrained by OECD guidelines or GLP protocols – 
since they are not performed for regulatory purposes – may be more informative on 
potential unanticipated adverse effects, as that they may test for effects beyond 
what is foreseen in the OECD test guidelines. 
• Just because a scientific study is not OECD/GLP compliant does not mean that an 
endpoint within the study is irrelevant to risk characterisation. Studies reporting 
adverse effects other than those examined in official regulatory testing are relevant 
for regulatory purposes and must be considered in risk assessments.  
• Studies of pesticide formulations, studies of isolated active ingredients, and studies 
using different routes of exposure than those described in guidelines, should be 
included in a systematic review and weighed for relevance. For example, evidence 
about the toxicity of whole formulations is more directly relevant than studies of 
isolated active ingredients, as it reflects the use of the pesticide in the field once 
authorisation has been granted. 
• Industry-sponsored evaluations of the scientific evidence must be considered as 
having a risk of bias since they are financed by the industry that has a commercial 
                                            
50 Rooney AA et al (2014). Systematic review and evidence integration for literature-based environmental 
health science assessments. Environmental Health Perspectives 122(7). 
https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/1307972/   
51 EFSA (2010). Application of systematic review methodology to food and feed safety assessments to 
support decision making. EFSA Journal. June 1. https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/1637   
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interest in placing the chemicals on the market (see 1.1 for the proposed solution to 
this problem). 
 
2.6. Scientific evidence for adverse effects is frequently dismissed 
for unscientific and non-transparent reasons 
Invalid reasons for dismissing scientific evidence for adverse effects include (but are 
not limited to52) claims that the observed effect(s) is:  
• within the range of historical control data and therefore spontaneously occurring. 
The cited historical control data is generally unpublished and unavailable to the 
public. 
• a secondary effect to overall toxicity  
• non-relevant for humans (or to wildlife populations in cases of non-target 
organisms), in cases when species other than the standard species of regulatory 
toxicity studies were used 
• inconsistent with data from other studies. 
 
Proposed solutions 
The above arguments should be accepted as valid only when a scientific evidence-
based justification is provided. Otherwise they are purely speculative and should be 
deemed unacceptable. 
Adverse effects observed in animal studies should be evaluated and given weight 
according to explicit and consistent scientific criteria, established by a panel of 
independent scientists and applied in a systematic review.  
Historical control data must not be used to dismiss significant effects found in treated 
animals following comparison with concurrent control of non-exposed animals. Studies 
and risk assessments should follow the OECD Guidance Document 116 on the 
Conduct and Design of Chronic Toxicity and Carcinogenicity Studies, which stipulates 
                                            
52 Clausing et al (2018). Pesticides and public health: An analysis of the regulatory approach to 
assessing the carcinogenicity of glyphosate in the European Union. Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health. Mar 13. http://jech.bmj.com/content/early/2018/03/06/jech-2017-209776  
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that the concurrent control data provide the most valid comparison. The Guidance 
imposes stringent restrictions on the type and source of historical control data that may 
be used, as well as on how these data are used.  
In the analysis and interpretation of results from laboratory studies, the analysis should 
match the design. If animals are exposed to different concentrations of the substance, a 
trend analysis should be mandatory.  
 
2.7. Toxicity of pesticide formulations is not addressed 
Decisions on pesticide authorisations are made based on an assessment of the toxicity 
of the declared “active ingredient” of the pesticide product. Co-formulants53 and 
adjuvants54 are considered secondary and the toxicity of the whole mixed formulated 
pesticide products – which are the actual exposures experienced by humans – is not 
evaluated. Frequently, academic studies on effects of formulated products are 
dismissed completely from the assessments and are not taken into consideration at all, 
even in the overall evaluation of the active substance. Moreover, most co-formulants 
are considered to be proprietary secrets and remain undisclosed.  
 
Proposed solutions 
A worst-case reference formulation containing the highest concentration of active 
substance(s) and adjuvants that the applicant would consider marketing should be 
defined. Dilutions of this formulation should be tested in long-term in vivo studies to try 
to identify a no-observed-adverse-effect level (NOAEL).  
All pesticide ingredients should be assessed in a tiered approach, alone and in 
combination (formulation). In the first tier, substances should be tested in vitro in high-
throughput assays to assess endpoints such as endocrine disruption, neurotoxicity, or 
genotoxicity. When an active ingredient, adjuvant, or formulation leads to a positive 
result in a bioassay, this should trigger higher-tier animal testing for the specific 
                                            
53 Co-formulants are substances or preparations which are used or intended to be used in a plant 
protection product or adjuvant, but are neither active substances nor safeners or synergists. 
54 Adjuvants are defined as mixtures or preparations which are marketed separately and are mixed with a 
plant protection product before use to increase the product’s efficacy. 
 34 
 
34 White Paper: Reform of Pesticide Risk Assessment in Europe 
endpoint, using realistic levels of exposure in sensitive in vivo tests. This would be in 
agreement with the opinion on the risk assessment of chemical mixtures from EFSA, 
which recommends a whole mixture approach to encompass any unidentified materials  
in mixtures and interactions between mixture components55. 
Despite the shortcomings of tests performed in animals and the frequently expressed 
desire to minimise such testing, in vivo toxicological studies on rodents are still 
necessary to assess endpoints that in vitro toxicity assays cannot assess. 
Non-regulatory studies on formulated products containing the primary pesticide active 
ingredient in the risk evaluation should be included in the risk assessment by taking 
them into consideration in the weight of evidence approach. 
Information on adjuvants and co-formulants should be published, notwithstanding 
industry pleas for commercial confidentiality. Adjuvants, as much as active ingredients, 
must be considered as “emissions into the environment”. According to Article 4.4(d) of 
the Aarhus Convention on public access to documents and Article 6 (1) of the Aarhus 
Regulation EC No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention, information relating to emissions into the environment has to be disclosed 
since there is an overidding public interest (Article 4.2; Reg. EC 1049/2001).   
 
2.8. Toxicity of pesticide mixtures is not addressed 
In real-life conditions, people are always exposed to several chemicals (including 
pesticides) at the same time. These chemicals may work through similar and/or 
interacting mechanisms, with both options bringing additional risks. In fact, farmers 
often use cocktails of pesticide products on their crops. Despite the political decisions 
(enshrined in Reg. EC 296/2005 and EC 1107/2009) to take combination effects into 
account, the potential effects of chemical mixtures are still ignored in risk assessment 
and in risk management policy-making. This is also the case for the assessment of 
chemicals across the board. These omissions create a dangerous blind spot and 
prevent public authorities from regulating real-life exposures to mixtures of chemicals.  
                                            
55 EFSA (2013). Scientific report of EFSA: International frameworks dealing with human risk assessment 
of combined exposure to multiple chemicals EFSA Journal 11(7):3313. 
https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.2903/j.efsa.2013.3313  
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Proposed solutions 
• Prioritise the testing and evaluation of mixtures in the following order: (1) co-
formulated products; (2) products approved to be mixed prior to application; (3) 
based on post-approval monitoring, pesticide ingredients that are frequently 
encountered simultaneously in residue analyses. 
• The identity of all components of pesticide mixtures must be disclosed. A full set of 
toxicological data must be made available for all these components in order to 
facilitate a transparent risk assessment.  
• The possible combination effects of chemicals should be evaluated by an 
overarching risk assessment of the toxicological data of all components of the 
mixtures (including adjuvants of formulations), with a consideration of common 
mechanisms. Tailored testing should be performed that would enable toxicity to be 
evaluated from interactions with receptors as well as toxicokinetics and metabolism. 
• Currently the NOAEL taken from an animal study is divided by an uncertainty or 
safety factor of 100, in order to extrapolate from animal studies to the exposed 
human population and set a “safe” dose (acceptable daily intake or ADI). This factor 
supposedly accounts for potential differences in response across species (e.g. rats 
and humans), as well as across individuals of the same species: a 10-fold factor is 
used for inter-species variability and a 10-fold factor for intra-individual variability, 
even though evidence suggests that variability can be greater than implied by those 
figures. Where a combination analysis is not carried out, an extra safety factor of at 
least 10 should be applied to address potential mixture toxicity, resulting in a total 
safety factor of at least 1000.  
 
2.9. Weight of evidence is misused 
The variability of biological responses, as well as differences in study methods and 
statistical power, can result in individual studies producing “contradictory” results (e.g. 
an observed effect can be statistically significant in some studies, but not in other 
similar ones).  
Risk assessors often claim to use an approach called “weight of evidence” (WoE) to 
reconcile such contradictions. However, WoE is currently inadequately formalized as a 
methodology and is not documented in sufficient detail to provide transparency of 
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approach when used. Relevant results are dismissed, outcomes of the assessments 
seem flawed, and it is not possible to determine if disagreement is due to 
misapplication of methods, genuine scientific uncertainty, or biased processes. 
 
Proposed solutions 
Use of WoE must be transparent and should include explicitly systematic approaches. 
The common practice of simply stating that a WoE approach was followed is 
insufficient. It needs to be specified which (of many) criteria have been used to select 
relevant studies and how they have been weighed.  
Furthermore, an integrated approach should be mandatory (Rooney et al, 2014)56. For 
instance, if evidence comes from both animal studies and epidemiology, and both lines 
of evidence are limited but point in the same direction, their mutual support must 
become part of the WoE. Assessing and dismissing them separately because evidence 
from each area was “too light” is not a scientifically valid approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
56 Rooney AA, Boyles AL, Wolfe MS, Bucher JR, Thayer KA (2014). Systematic review and evidence 
integration for literature-based environmental health science assessments. Environ Health Perspect 
122:711–718. http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1307972  
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